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JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code sections 78-
2a3(2)(h), 0) (2004). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
ISSUE 1. Did the trial court properly dismiss Appellant Roger Bryner's petition 
for a civil stalking injunction? 
Standard of Review: This court reviews a trial court's legal conclusions for 
correctness and its factual findings for clear error. See Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 
380,117, 80 P.3d 553. To the extent that the issues presented in this case involve a mixed 
question of law and fact, such as determining whether "a given set of facts come within 
the reach of a given rule of law/' this court reviews legal questions for correctness while 
granting the trial court discretion in its application of the law to the given set of facts. Id. 
ISSUE 2. Did the trial court act properly in the face of Roger Bryner's motion to 
recuse? 
Standard of Review: Determining whether a trial court acted properly in the face 
of a motion to recuse presents a question of law that this court reviews for correctness. 
See Barnard v. Murphy, 852 P.2d 1023, 1024 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (Barnard I); see also 
State v. Alamo, 973 P.2d 975, 979 (Utah 1998); In re ML., 965 P.2d 551, 556 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Although Appellant Roger Bryner ("Bryner") argues that the trial court erred in the 
way that it addressed his Petition for a Civil Stalking Injunction, and erred in dismissing 
his petition and dissolving his ex-parte injunction against Appellee Svetlana Bryner 
("Lana"), his arguments should be rejected. To successfully seek a civil stalking 
injunction, a party is required to present sufficient evidence to prove that the opposing 
party engaged in a course of conduct that would have caused a reasonable person to suffer 
emotional distress. Furthermore, under this court's interpretation of the civil stalking 
injunction statute, conduct that would cause a reasonable person mere anxiety or 
frustration is insufficient to support an injunctions, but instead the conduct must be 
somehow threatening in nature. 
Here, Bryner failed to present the trial court with any evidence that would suggest 
that Lana had engaged in a course of conduct directed at him, let alone that her conduct 
would have caused a reasonable person to suffer emotional distress that would be 
sufficient to satisfy the requirements under the statute. Instead, the only evidence 
presented that supported any of Bryner's allegations was introduced by Lana, and her 
testimony supported just one of Bryner's allegations. This one allegation certainly does 
not rise to the level of a "course of conduct," and although the conduct may not have been 
optimal, it also was insufficient to support a conclusion that it alone would have caused a 
reasonable person to suffer emotional distress. 
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Moreover, even if the trial court had accepted all of Bryner's allegations as true, 
taken as a whole the allegations would not produce emotional distress as defined by this 
court. Instead, the conduct Bryner alleged merely highlighted the fact that the parties 
were engaged in a protracted and unpleasant custody litigation. See Salt Lake City v. 
Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (holding that "[ljimited contact during 
legitimate innocent encounters such as picking up children [or attempting to engage in 
court ordered telephone contact], without conduct directed at causing physical harm or 
emotional distress to an intended person, does not fall under that [stalking] statute's 
purview"). Simply stated, Bryner failed to allege sufficient grounds to support his 
petition for a civil stalking injunction and he failed to produce evidence to support 
virtually all of his allegations. In the absence of proper allegations, or evidence that Lana 
had engaged in threatening conduct, the trial court properly dismissed Bryner's complaint 
and dissolved the ex-parte protective order that had been in place pending the hearing. 
Further, the trial court acted properly in the face of Bryner's motion to recuse 
Judge Lindberg. As fully explained by this court, once the trial court is presented with a 
motion to recuse, it has only two acceptable courses of action. First, the court can deem 
the motion well-grounded and reassign the case. Second, if the court instead concludes 
that the grounds offered in the motion are not legally sufficient, it is required to refer the 
matter to another judge for review. The matter is then stayed until the judge to whom the 
matter is referred makes a determination concerning the motion, and if that judge concurs 
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with the trial court, the trial court is then authorized to proceed with the case. Judge 
Lindberg followed this procedure. After the case was transferred to Judge Lindberg, as a 
result of Lana's Motion, Bryner notified the court that he had previously filed a motion to 
recuse Judge Lindberg in the parties' domestic case, and that he was renewing that 
motion in this case through incorporation by reference. Upon learning of Bryner's 
motion, Judge Lindberg evaluated the legal sufficiency of Bryner's claims, and after she 
concluded that the grounds Bryner asserted in the motion were insufficient to warrant 
recusal, she referred the matter to the Associate Presiding Judge of the Third District 
Court, the Honorable Robert Hilder, for further review. She also stayed any further action 
on the case pending Judge Hilder's decision. Only after Judge Hilder informed the court 
that he too found the grounds offered in the motion legally insufficient to warrant recusal 
did the trial court permit itself to carry on with the scheduled evidentiary hearing. Such 
conduct comports precisely with the requirements set under rule 63 of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and as articulated that Utah's appellate courts, and Bryner's arguments 
concerning his motion to recuse should be summarily rejected. 
Finally, to the extent that the trial court committed any errors in this case, the 
errors had no impact on its outcome. Specifically, to be entitled to a civil stalking 
injunction, Bryner was required to prove that Lana had engaged in a course of conduct, 
directed at him, that would have led a reasonable person in his position to suffer the legal 
definition of emotional distress. See Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, f 30, 136 P.3d 
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1242 (quoting Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998)) 
(defining emotional distress as the condition of being '"unable to adequately cope with 
the mental stress engendered by the circumstances of the case'"). 
Taken as a whole, the Byner's allegations were facially insufficient to satisfy this 
burden. Bryner made no effort to allege that Lana had ever engaged in threatening 
behavior, but instead, he alleged that she had engaged in conduct that would have, at 
most, caused a reasonable person to suffer some degree of anxiety or annoyance, which, 
as this court has clearly stated, is insufficient to warrant the imposition of a civil stalking 
injunction. Consequently, even if the court had committed the errors that Bryner claims 
on appeal, these errors had no impact on the outcome of this case; therefore, the alleged 
errors are harmless as a matter of law. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL 
OR STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions that are determinative on this appeal. 
However, as reflected in Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, 136 P.3d 1242, both section 
77-3a-101 (2004) and section 76-5-106.5 of the Utah Code are implicated in the instant 
appeal. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Procedural History of Nature of the Action: 
. '. The parties to this matter are involved in a protracted and cost!) domestic 
litigation, which h.u^  ill I Il i mimhn nl r#inliovrrsnu m ri ills lilt1 hul which fiiPSi/iilh 
is focused on matters relating'to the custody of the parties' two minor children. This case 
merely reflects another attempt on Biyner's part U ';if .em e the outcome of the domestic 
matter, and the trial court not only recognized lirv nu , uiu .*.. », also recognized that his 
ptliliiiifi I'm "i I r ml sliilkiiiu? iii|iiiiirliinii njs lq.ialh iiisiillianiil mil lln ml Ihnrlmi 
dismissed Biyner's Petition. 
Bryner tiled this, his second petition for a civ il Stalking injunction against Lana, 
onFebruarv *. . ,.. \j \ i \} , aJ (u n e amen ucu 
2i; :l OnN*.; 
injunction. (R. 233-36). In response, on March 7, 2000 Lana requested a hearing to 
contest Bryner's petition and allegations. (R. 251-52). Lana also moved for this case to 
either be transferred to Jud^c i ..i.idocrg or consolidated with the domestic case because 
in
 a better position to evaluate Biyner's claims (R. 253-56). Although Bryner contested 
• Although Bryner filed a document entitled amended petition for ov • i 
stalking injunction, even a cursory review of that document reveals that it is r^-\w 
described as a civil complaint inappropriate to the mechanisms that the legislature ha>. iut 
in place to protect those who are legitimately suffering the impact of a stalker, 
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the motion for consolidation or transfer (R. 259-62), the trial court granted Lana's motion 
and reassigned Bryner's petition, which placed Judge Lindberg in the position of hearing 
the petition. (R. 378-79). Bryner then filed several motions in this case, including a 
motion seeking sanctions pursuant to rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (R. 
263-65), a motion for partial summary judgment (R. 266-347), a motion for default or 
partial default (R. 402-03), and a request for admissions (R. 475-79). Bryner also moved 
to recuse Judge Lindberg, relying by reference on a motion to recuse that he had filed in 
the domestic matter. (R. 528-29). Judge Lindberg, upon learning of Bryner's motion to 
recuse, evaluated his motion, found that the grounds were "legally insufficient" to warrant 
recusal, and referred the motion to the Associate Presiding Judge of the Third District 
Court, Judge Robert Hilder. (R. 596). After reviewing the motion, Judge Hilder also 
concluded that Bryner had presented insufficient grounds to warrant Judge Lindberg's 
recusal and he informed Judge Lindberg of his decision and that he would be issuing an 
order sometime later. (R. 597, 628). Judge Lindberg then conducted a hearing on 
Bryner's Petition for a Civil Stalking Injunction on April 11, 2006, wherein the parties 
were permitted to introduce evidence and testimony. (R. 627-41; R. 743).2 Following the 
hearing, the trial court concluded that Bryner's allegations were insufficient to support the 
imposition of either a permanent injunction, or the continuation of the ex parte injunction 
2
 The transcript of the hearing is noted as R. 743. Any reference to the 
transcript in Lana's brief will note the record number and the relevant page, i.e., R. 743, 
15. 
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imposed following Bryner's filing of the petition, (R. 633-634). The court therefore 
dismissed the petition, and lifted the ex parte injunction (R. 639). Bryner first w™ 
the ruling to the Utah Supii'ine unul, Iiinu.ii"!, llial UH ml I iii'ik-rred Bvnti '>s «i| ) 
II. Statement of Relevant Facts 
The parties to this case were involved in a long term, relationship, wrhich produced 
two children, but since the birth ol tht eliildieii, the relationship \\LV« I dcjcJ tin I il 
parties in1 IIM nl'i nl in .i pn»li'Mrlr(l donu stu IIII^ MIIMM |K ' MHIKT'S Petition for Fx 
Parte Stalking Injunction). The parties, ostensibly, share custody of the children and have 
been granted telephone visitation privileges with the children when they are in the other's 
custody ;:\ee genera^* ,'» lust pdiiion llm nul ill stalling 
i l l ] m i , > i 
November 10, 2005, the parlies stipulated to the dismissal of that petition (R. 743, 25), 
and the trial court officially dismissed the petition on January 43 2006 (R. 743, 26). The 
terms of the ex parte ci vil injunc tion issued pursuant In lllie Sqilembui I1' (HI i pdition 
iiiin'lliiiilnl ecilaiiii i ont.inf limiliilnms Jipplieahk1 In I miii hut il contained no limitations on 
her right to contact the children by telephone when they were in Bryner's custody, (R 
'
 3
 The details of the parties5 custody arrangement do not specifically appear in 
'the record of this case; however., there is no dispute that-since the inception of the 
domestic matter the parties have shared custody of the children, and that included .; 
arrangement are telephone visitation privileges. 
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743, 46; 629). Thus, while the children were with Bryner on January 3, 2006, Lana 
attempted to exercise her telephonic visitation right, only to have Bryner's repeatedly lift 
the receiver and the replace it in the cradle, ending the call and denying Lana the 
opportunity to speak with the children. (R. 629; 743, 10-11). 
On February 27, after the first petition had been put to rest, Bryner filed another 
petition for a civil stalking injunction against Lana, alleging that she had engaged in 
stalking behavior through the use of the telephone and e-mail, contact with his employers, 
possession of an embarrassing photograph, use of the internet in a fashion upsetting to 
Bryner, and for a variety of other reasons connected to the parties' ongoing custody 
dispute. (R. 1-13). As a result, Bryner obtained another ex parte civil stalking injunction 
against Lana, which again restricted her access to her children. (R. 3).4 Lana requested a 
hearing to dispute Bryner's allegations and to dissolve the temporary injunction. (R. 251-
52). The trial court scheduled a hearing for April 11, 2006, but prior to the hearing, 
Bryner submitted a motion seeking Judge Lindberg's recusal, which merely incorporated 
by reference a motion that Bryner had filed in the domestic case. (R. 627-28). The trial 
4
 Bryner filed an "Amended Petition for Civil Stalking Injunction" the very 
next day. (R. 115-21). However, the amended petition is better described as an actual 
civil complaint, rather than a petition for a civil stalking injunction, in that it contains 
causes of action that Bryner should have brought in a separate action. (R. 115-21). The 
trial court, in its amended order, explained that Bryner's attempt to inject other causes of 
action into these proceedings was improper and "reflected] a misunderstanding of 
stalking injunctions." (R. 635-36). The court thus struck Bryner's motions for summary 
judgment, for sanctions under rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and his 
request for the entry of a default judgment in his favor. (R. 635-36). 
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court reviewed the motion and evaluated the grounds that Bryner offered, only to find 
them insufficient to warrant recusal. (R. 569; 628; 743, 3). The court then referred the 
motion to the Associate Presiding Judge of the Third District Court, the Honorable Robert 
Hilder, for additional review and a final determination. (R. 569; 628; 743, 3-4). The trial 
court stayed any further activity in this case pending Judge Hilder's determination. (R. 
569; 628; 743, 3). Judge Hilder quickly reviewed the matter and informed the trial court 
that he concurred with its decision concerning recusal and that he would issue an order, 
but that the court was free to pursue further proceedings in this case. (R. 628). 
Subsequently, on April 11, 2006, the trial court held a hearing on Bryner's petition, 
during which the court heard testimony from both Lana and Bryner. (R. 743). After 
considering both parties' testimony, the court determined that Bryner had failed to present 
the court with any evidence in support of most of the allegations in his petition, and the 
court then dismissed his petition and dissolved the ex parte injunction that had been 
entered against Lana. (R. 633-34). The court also entered an order directing both parties 
to follow the rules of civility. (R. 634-35). Bryner subsequently appealed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN 
DISMISSING APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR A 
CIVIL STALKING INJUNCTION AGAINST 
LANA 
The trial court properly dismissed Bryner's Petition for a Civil Stalking Injunction 
against Lana, and the court supported its decision with sufficient factual findings. To 
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qualify for injunctive relief under Utah's Civil Stalking Statute, Bryner was required to 
demonstrate to the court that Lana had engaged in a "course of conduct" that was 
intended to cause Bryner "emotional distress." Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT App 150, fflf 19-
21, 136 P.3d 1242 (discussing Utah Code sections 77-3a-101 and 76-5-106.5). '"Course 
of conduct' means repeatedly maintaining a visual or physical proximity to a person or 
repeatedly conveying verbal or written threats or threats implied by conduct or a 
combination thereof directed at or toward a person." Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 
1259, 1263 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-106.5 (1995)). 
Emotional distress "'results from conduct that is "outrageous and intolerable in that it 
offends the generally accepted standards of decency and morality.'"" Stam, 2006 UT App 
150 at Tf 29. The emotional distress requirement is not satisfied by conduct that causes 
"mere anxiety or annoyance," Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1264, but instead "'the emotional 
distress suffered must be severe; it must be such that a reasonable [person,] normally 
constituted, would be unable to cope with the mental stress engendered by the 
circumstances of the case,'" Stam, 2006 UT App 150 at 130 (alterations and emphasis in 
original) (quoting Harnicher v. Univ. of Utah Med. Ctr., 962 P.2d 67, 70 (Utah 1998)). 
Moreover, "[t]he [stalking] statute is narrowly drafted to restrict only threatening 
behavior, with limited infringement to free association and movement." Lopez, 935 P.2d 
at 1264. 
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Here, after receiving Bryner's petition, Lana requested an evidentiary hearing, and 
"to avoid having [his] injunction revoked," Bryner was required to "demonstrate by a 
preponderance of the evidence that [Lana's] conduct satisfie[d] the elements of section 
76-5-105.5." Stam, 2006 UT App 150 at t20. However, as found by the trial court, 
Bryner failed to meet this burden. During the hearing, Bryner was afforded time to 
submit his testimony and any evidence that would support his allegations. He spent the 
majority of his time examining Lana, (R. 743, 25-38), and during the time that he testified 
he failed to produce any evidence to support even the most innocent of his allegations (R. 
743, 39-44). The trial court found, after permitting both parties the opportunity to 
introduce testimony and evidence, that Bryner failed to show either that Lana had 
engaged in a "course of conduct" against Bryner, or that the conduct Lana was found to 
have undertaken was sufficient to produce in a reasonable person emotional distress. The 
court specifically found that Lana had an ongoing right to telephonic visitation with the 
children, and that any incident of repeated calls to Bryner's home during their visitation 
was the product of Bryner's conduct, not Lana's. (R. 629). The court further found that 
Bryner had introduced no evidence to contradict Lana's testimony that Bryner had 
triggered the repeat calls, (R. 629; 743, 10-11). The court then found that Bryner had 
introduced no evidence to support his allegations that Lana had instigated several 
unwanted contacts with his employers or that the contacts that Lana had made caused any 
emotional distress. (R. 631; 743, 12-13). Instead, the court found that Lana had 
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contacted Bryner's employer either at his request, or to return property of the employer 
that she found at her home. (R. 631; 743, 12-14). The court made similar findings 
concerning Bryner's allegations that Lana was stalking him at the children's school and 
that Lana had stalked him on a local Russian language website. Specifically, the court 
found that Bryner had failed to produce evidence that would support his stalking 
allegations related to the children's school, (R. 632; 743, 39-41), and that Lana's postings 
to the Russian language website did not involve or refer to Bryner (R. 632; 743, 14-16). 
Finally, the court found that although Lana has a friend in the employ of the "KGB," a 
foreign intelligence service, Bryner's assertions that the relationship caused him 
emotional distress was incredible and unsupported by any evidence. (R. 633; 743, 20). 
The court did find that Lana had maintained possession of a photograph embarrassing to 
Bryner and that she had published the photo to a custody evaluator, but the court also 
found that this act on Lana's part was "isolated" and that it did not alone rise to a "course 
of conduct." (R. 630). 
Taken as a whole, the evidence presented in this case supports the trial court's 
findings. Bryner presented the court with no evidence to support virtually any of his 
allegations, and he made no effort to demonstrate that under the circumstances of this 
case, a reasonable person would have been threatened by Lana's alleged conduct. 
Instead, Bryner alleged, without evidence, that Lana had undertaken a number of acts, 
which, taken as a whole, had they been true, may have been sufficient to cause anxiety or 
13 
annoyance, but this is not the conduct targeted under the statute. But, as found by the trial 
court, Bryner failed to support most of his individual allegations, and the court found that 
the sole allegation that had evidentiary support-provided by Lana's admission-was 
insufficient to rise to the level of a "course of conduct," let alone sufficient to cause 
"emotional distress" in a reasonable person. Because Bryner submitted no evidence to 
support his allegations, the trial court's findings are accurate, and in the absence of any 
evidence that Lana had engaged in a "course of conduct" directed at Bryner, the court had 
no choice but to find the Petition to be legally insufficient to warrant the imposition of an 
injunction against Lana. 
Consequently, this court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of Bryner's 
petition and dissolution of the ex-parte injunction against Lana.5 
Bryner argues, without authority, that the trial court erred in denying him 
the opportunity to bring an Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress claim in his 
petition for a civil stalking injunction, and in denying his attempts to argue either for the 
grant of summary judgment in this case, or for the entry of a default judgment. However, 
not only does Bryner's argument violate the principles of rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, see Water & Energy Sys. Tech, Inc. v. Keil, 2002 UT 32, f 20, 48 
P.3d 888 (stating "appealing parties must clearly define the issues presented on appeal 
with pertinent authority cited" (quotations, citations, and alterations omitted)), his 
argument also fails to recognize that the plain language of section 77-3a-101 clearly limits 
the scope and application of the civil stalking statute. Simply stated, section 77-3 a-101 
does not include the possibility that a petitioner will use the petition as a vehicle for 
bringing other civil causes of action or that the broad rules of civil procedure will apply. 
See Carter v. Univ. Of Utah Med. Ctr., 2006 UT 78, ffif 8-9, 150 P.3d 467 (describing the 
only acceptable model for interpreting statutory language, which begins by analyzing the 
plain language of the statute in an attempt to ensure that the true intent of the legislature is 
carried out by the courts). Instead, the legislature has precisely defined the procedures 
and remedies available under the statute, and the trial court properly limited Bryner's 
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II. THE TRIAL COURT ACTED PROPERLY 
FOLLOWING APPELLANT'S MOTION TO 
RECUSE 
The trial court properly addressed Biyner's Motion to Recuse and its treatment of 
the motion was without error. "According to Rule 63(b), once a party or counsel files an 
affidavit charging that the judge harbors prejudice or bias toward the party or counsel, the 
judge has two courses of action." Barnard v. Murphy, 882 P.2d 679, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 
1994) {Barnard II). "First, if the point made in the affidavit is well taken, the judge can 
simply recuse himself and transfer responsibility for the case to another judge." Id; see 
also In re ML, 965 P.2d 55, 556 (Utah Ct. App. 1998);6 Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 
petition to the review permitted under section 77-3a-101. See Lopez, 935 P.2d at 1264 
(describing Utah stalking statutes as "narrowly drafted to restrict only threatening 
behavior"). Consequently, this court should reject Bryner's arguments in this regard and 
summarily affirm the trial court's determination. 
6
 Language this court cited in In re M.L. may be especially salient in this 
case, given its history. In In re M.L., this court stated 
"Family problems are complex but intricately intertwined so that the best 
treatment so far as the parties are concerned,... as well as the most 
consistent and efficient approach from a judicial point of view, is for the 
same judge to remain involved with the family along the continuum of the 
particular case." 
In re M.L., 965 P.2d 551, 557 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis in original) (quotingIn re 
Quick, 559 A.2d 42, 46 (Pa. Super. 1989)). Although In re M.L. dealt with the 
termination of parental rights, see id. at 553, the language has clear application to cases 
such as the instant case, where the parties are engaged in a protracted custody dispute and 
the best interests of the children are at stake. Here, although it is clear that Bryner 
disapproves of certain decisions that Judge Lindberg has made in the domestic matter, he 
has not alleged any facts that would suggest that her behavior toward him was 
"'extreme'" or that it reflected a '"deep-seated antagonism" toward him. Id. at 556 
(citation omitted). Absent some evidence of such behavior on Judge Lindberg's part, and 
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741 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). If, however, the trial court determines that the affidavit 
contains insufficient grounds to support recusal, the court is required to refer the affidavit 
to "another judge to determine whether there is insufficient rationale in the affidavit to 
prompt recusal." BarnardII, 882 P.2d at 682. Moreover, "[disqualification under Rule 
63(b) is warranted 'only, when it appeared that, apart from [the judge's] analysis of the 
issues of fact or law, he had such a bias in favor of one party or prejudice against the 
other that he could not fairly or impartially determine the issues.'" Frear, 946 P.2d at 742 
(quoting Orderville Irrigation Co. v. Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282, 409 P.2d 
616,621(1965)). 
In the instant case, Bryner, relying on rule 10(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, filed his motion to recuse Judge Lindberg on April 6, 2006, (R. 522-24), 
several weeks after the judge to whom this case had been initially assigned transferred the 
case to Judge Lindberg, (R. 378). The trial court then, upon learning of Bryner's motion, 
immediately evaluated the motion's legal sufficiency and concluded that Bryner had 
presented the court with insufficient grounds to support his petition. (R. 596: see also R. 
628; 743, 3-4). The court then referred the matter to the Associate Presiding Judge of the 
Third District Courts, Utah, the Honorable Robert Hilder, (R. 596, 628; 743, 3-4), who 
expedited his review of the motion and concluded that Bryner's motion was legally 
some argument concerning such behavior, Bryner's argument should be summarily 
rejected. 
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insufficient to require Judge Lindberg to recuse herself from this case. (R. 628; 743, 3-4). 
Judge Hilder informed the court of his decision and directed the trial court to proceed 
with the scheduled hearing. 
The trial court followed the required procedure exactly as outlined in rule 63 of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and Bryner has made no effort to articulate any harm that 
he may have suffered as a result of the trial court's decisions.7 Once the court received 
notice of the motion, it considered the motion, and after rejecting it as insufficient, the 
court directed it to another judge for a final decision. The court stayed any further 
consideration of matters pending in this case until the judge to whom the matter was 
7
 Bryner appears to argue that the trial court was required to wait for Judge 
Hilder to enter a written order dismissing Bryner's motion prior to proceeding with the 
hearing on his petition for a civil stalking injunction. However, although he points to rule 
63(b)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, he fails to point this court to any authority 
that would support his position. The trial court in this case clearly satisfied the 
requirement set forth in the language Bryner highlights, in that the trial court considered 
his motion, found it lacking, and referred it to another judge as required under the plain 
language of the rule. See Utah R. Civ. P. 63(b)(2). Only after the trial court had received 
word that the judge to whom she referred the motion had concluded that it was legally 
insufficient did the trial court proceed with this matter. To the extent that the trial court's 
actions were premature, no harm was done to Bryner, in that he had clearly failed to 
present the court with sufficient reason to support recusal; thus, any error on the trial 
court's part was harmless. See Poulsen v. Frear, 946 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997) (holding that the trial court's "improper comments in his certifying order were 
harmless error" because the appellant's affidavit to recuse the trial court judge was 
"insufficient as a matter of law"). Further, Bryner also appears to complain of the 
transfer order entered by Judge Dever, the judge initially assigned this case, and that 
Judge Dever failed to address Bryner's objection to the transfer. However, Judge Dever 
transferred the case in response to Lana's motion, and in doing so, he inferentially denied 
Bryner's objection. 
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referred reached his decision. This clearly satisfies the requirements of rule 63. 
Consequently, this court should conclude that the trial court acted properly in response to 
Bryner's motion to recuse, and reject Bryner's challenge to the court's decision and 
subsequent proceedings. 
III. ANY ERROR ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL 
COURT WAS HARMLESS 
Assuming that the trial court committed some error in the proceedings underlying 
this appeal, none of those possible errors impacted the outcome; therefore, any errors that 
did occur are harmless. "'Harmless error is defined . . . as an error that is sufficiently 
inconsequential that [this court] conclude[s] there is no reasonable likelihood that the 
error affected the outcome of the proceedings.'" Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, <f 21, 
80 P.3d 553 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 817 P.2d 789, 796 (Utah 1991)); see 
also Turville v. J & J Props., L.C, 2006 UT App 305, f 38, 145 P.3d 1146 (stating '""if, 
upon review of the record, there is clear evidence to support the trial court's ultimate 
conclusion," these failures are harmless error and the trial court's ruling may be 
affirmed'" (citations omitted)). "'[A]n error is harmful only if the likelihood of a 
different outcome is sufficiently high as to undermine [this court's] confidence in the'" 
trial court's decision. Covey, 2003 UT App 380 at Tf 21 (quoting Steffenson v. Smith's 
Mgmt. Corp., 820 P.2d 482, 489 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
Here, Bryner sought a civil stalking injunction against Lana. He asserted and 
alleged a number of acts on her part, including repeated phone calls, contact with his 
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employer, possession and distribution of an embarrassing photograph, and, on one 
occasion, that Lana made an obscene gesture toward him when they were exchanging 
custody of the children. As previously discussed, to prevail on his petition, Bryner is 
required to show that Lana engaged in a course of conduct directed toward him and that 
her conduct was sufficient to cause "'a reasonable [person,] normally constituted [to] be 
unable to adequately cope with the mental stress engendered be the circumstances of the 
caser Ellison v. Stam, 2006 UT 150,130, 136 P.3d 1242 (citation omitted). "The 
statute is narrowly drafted to restrict only threatening behavior, with only limited 
infringement on the right to free association," Salt Lake City v. Lopez, 935 P.2d 1259, 
1264 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), and it affirmatively does not apply to normal conduct related 
to visitation in a contested domestic situation, see id, or to conduct that, taken as a whole, 
may cause a reasonable person to suffer anxiety or annoyance. 
Here, even accepting as true all of the errors that Bryner alleges the trial court 
committed, the outcome would not have changed. Bryner made no allegation that Lana 
ever engaged in threatening conduct, and the allegations that he did assert suggest nothing 
that would support a conclusion that a normal, reasonable person would have been 
reduced to a state where they could no longer cope with the mental stress of the 
circumstance. Instead, although it appears that Bryner is annoyed with Lana, his 
allegations merely highlight that Bryner is engaged in a protracted and ongoing custodial 
dispute with Lana that makes him unhappy. This dispute, while not optimal, should not 
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be unexpected given the circumstances of the case; circumstances that the trial court fully 
knows, and which the court took into account in addressing Bryner's petition, as required 
under the statute, and articulated by Stam. See Stam, 2006 UT App 150 at Tf 29 (noting 
that "the consideration of whether a defendant has acted outrageously must be undertaken 
in light of all of the facts and circumstances of the particular case"). When viewed in 
light of the ongoing domestic litigation, and the parties' contested custodial arrangement, 
there can be no question that Bryner's allegations, even when accepted without challenge, 
do not rise to the level of stalking. No reasonable person would have felt threatened by 
the alleged conduct, let alone reduced to condition wherein that reasonable person would 
have been unable to cope, as required under the statute. In the absence of allegations that 
would satisfy the requirement that Lana conduct create emotional distress as defined by 
the court's of this state, Bryner petition fails on its face. 
Consequently, given the circumstances of this case, any error committed by the 
trial court in these proceedings, if any occurred, had no affect on the outcome, and 
accordingly, any errors were harmless as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court did not err in dismissing Bryner's Petition for a Civil Stalking 
Injunction. Bryner failed to produce any evidence to support most of his allegations in 
the petition, and in the absence of evidence, Bryner could not show that Lana had 
engaged in a course of conduct that led him to suffer emotional distress. Further, the trial 
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court's treatment of Bryner's Motion to Recuse followed the required procedures. The 
trial court evaluated Bryner's motion, and after finding that it failed to assert sufficient 
grounds to warrant recusal, the trial court referred it to another judge for a final 
determination and waited for that determination before addressing any of the matters that 
were pending before the court when the motion was filed. Finally, to the extent that the 
trial court committed any errors in this case, those errors were harmless, in that there was 
no reasonable possibility that they affected the outcome. 
Accordingly, this court should affirm the trial court's decision. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this to day of February, 2007. 
>PAPORT & SEGAL, P.C. 
Thomas J. Bums 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellee 
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